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USSR-SALT: A Soviet journalist has told a US Embassy official in Moscow that successful strategic arms limitations talks could lead to US-USSR cooperation in other areas.

This appears to be a familiar gambit by which the Soviets prod the US to be more forthcoming, claiming that this will strengthen the more Western-minded faction in the Kremlin.

Valentin Berezhkov, the acting editor of a news weekly, said on 3 November that the Soviet leadership is looking to the talks for signs of US willingness to enter an era of negotiations. Soviet diplomats at the UN have taken a similar line. They emphasized that Moscow expects the US attitude toward the Soviet resolution on international security to be reflected at the arms talks. Gromyko introduced this resolution at the General Assembly in September.

In the past, the Soviets have shown annoyance when public US statements similarly linked disarmament progress to other problems, possibly believing that Washington was trying to make the USSR appear responsible for any lack of progress at the upcoming talks. The Soviets may also fear that linkage will imply that the superpowers are colluding to determine the outcome of such international crises as Vietnam and the Middle East. Moscow would not want to be susceptible to this charge from Communist or nonaligned nations.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin said on 30 October that First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has been formally designated head of the delegation, but he will be unable to attend the opening of the talks on 17 November because he is in Peking. [Meanwhile, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has informed the US that the delegation for Helsinki will be headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov.

West Germany - East Germany: An adviser to Chancellor Brandt has revealed some of Bonn's priorities in its efforts to develop a closer relationship with East Germany.

Egon Bahr, state secretary in the Chancellery and a longtime confidant of Brandt, has told US officials privately that the new government would begin its Eastern policy by attempting to negotiate renunciation of force agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany in turn. He said that West Germany would require that such agreements be completed before it would participate in a European security conference. Bahr thought the Soviets had made a mistake by publicly engaging their prestige for an early conference, thus giving Western countries an advantage in insisting that certain conditions be met first.

In pursuing a dialogue with East Germany, Bonn hopes ultimately to negotiate an all-German treaty, according to Bahr. The treaty would provide for a modus vivendi on the basis of the existence of two German states. Bonn would not formally recognize East Germany, nor would Allied rights in Berlin be affected.

As a last step following the negotiation of a renunciation of force agreement and of a treaty, Bonn would give up its opposition to third country recognitions of East Germany. It would do this, however, only in return for East German guarantees of West German access to Berlin. Bahr said the measures in Bonn's program would have to be taken rapidly--perhaps within a year--lest a flood of third country recognitions undermine Bonn's negotiating position. Bahr said that Western Allied soundings in Moscow on Berlin should continue in tandem with Bonn's own efforts with regard to East Germany.

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